Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace by Biddle, C. Bradford
Legislating Market Winners: Digital 
Signature Laws and the 
Electronic Commerce Marketplace 
C. BRADFORD BIDDLE• 
Abstract: "Legislating Market Winners" argues that 
certain enacted digital signature laws are premised upon 
false assumptions, and inappropriately enshrine a business 
model which would not evolve naturally in the market-
place. In attempting to solve an unsolvable liability 
allocation problem, such legislation harms consumers and 
the future evolution of electronic commerce. The article 
points out that alternative business models can solve the 
liability allocation problem. Despite obvious flaws, 
legislation of this type continues to be proposed, partly 
because the infrastructure created by these laws coincides 
with the needs of key escrow proponents. Ultimately the 
article argues that digital signature laws, which impose a 
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particular view of electronic commerce, should be aban-
doned, in Javor of laws which remove specific, well-
defined barriers to electronic commerce and which allow 
the electronic commerce marketplace to evolve unfettered. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The argument goes something like this: Internet commerce is 
hampered by the authentication problem. There is no reliable way to 
ensure that the sender of an electronic transmission is in fact who they 
purport to be. Digital signatures, supported by a "public key infrastruc-
ture" of certification authorities (CAs) and certificate databases, can 
solve this authentication problem. CAs will not emerge under the 
current legal regime, however, because they face uncertain and 
potentially immense liability exposure. Additionally, the legal status of 
digitally signed documents is unclear. Therefore, legislation is needed 
which defines and limits CA liability and which establishes the legality 
of digitally signed documents. Such legislation will solve the authentica-
tion problem and result in robust Internet commerce. 
This argument has captured an influential segment of the legal 
community, and has led to the enactment of "digital signature legisla-
tion" in several U.S. states and foreign nations. Unfortunately, the 
argument is built on fundamentally flawed assumptions and the 
legislation enacted based upon it is correspondingly flawed. Much (but 
not all) of the digital signature legislation enacted to date presumes a 
vision of electronic commerce that simply is not tenable, and which 
would not "naturally'' evolve in the marketplace. This legislation poses 
the risk of profoundly distorting an infant market and locking in business 
models which are harmful to consumers and to the future development 
of electronic commerce. 
The type of public key infrastructure (PKI) envisioned by many of the 
existing digital signature laws is not viable. The problem is liability. 
Digital signature legislation drafters have assumed that the potential 
liability exposure faced by CAs is somehow a flaw of the existing legal 
regime. This is an erroneous assumption: the liability exposure faced by 
CAs under the "open PIG" model envisioned by legislation drafters is 
a product of a business model that cannot internalize the costs associated 
with its implementation. Moreover, in attempting to limit the liability 
exposure of CAs, current digital signature laws shift an immense liability 
burden onto consumers who use the infrastructure envisioned by these 
laws. Putting this type of liability burden on consumers violates long-
held tenets of public policy, and is a result which consumers would 
reject in any truly ''bargained for'' transaction. 
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Digital signatures will undoubtedly play a significant role in electronic 
commerce. However, rather than being implemented in the "open PIG" 
model envisioned by various digital signature laws, digital signatures are 
more likely to be utilized under a "closed PK.I'' model. Under a closed 
PK.I system, the liability problems associated with digital signatures 
become much more manageable. Closed PK.I offers several other 
advantages as well. This article describes the differences between open 
and closed PK.I, and suggests that, in the absence of legislative 
displacement, certain marketplace trends indicate that closed PK.I is 
indeed the likely market winner. 
The open PK.I model can and should compete against closed PK.I and 
other authentication technologies, and should not be accorded special 
legal status via legislation. Such legislation -is unnecessary: the 
"contractual privity problem" which is used to justify open PKI 
legislation is a red herring. Commercial CAs utilizing the open PK.I 
model can compete in the marketplace without special PK.I legislation. 
These CAs are unlikely to succeed, not because of flaws with the legal 
system, but because the open PKI model is not a winning business 
model. 
Despite raising the very peculiar specter of regulating an essentially 
nonexistent industry (CAs), and despite increased recognition of the 
problems associated with the very specific vision of electronic commerce 
embodied in these digital signature laws, laws based on the open PKI 
model continue to be proposed and implemented. This article suggests 
that one of several factors behind the continued momentum of this 
legislation, particularly at the federal and international levels, is its 
synergy with cryptographic "key escrow" proposals. While digital 
signature legislation ostensibly addresses the use of cryptography only 
for the purposes of authentication, and not for confidentiality, the 
infrastructure created by these laws is ideal for implementing a key 
escrow scheme. 
Ultimately this article argues that digital signature laws which impose 
a particular view of electronic commerce should be abandoned. Laws 
which remove specific, well-defined barriers to electronic com-
merce-such as unnecessary ''writing" or handwritten signature 
requirements-and which allow the electronic commerce marketplace to 
evolve unfettered should be encouraged. 
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II. BACKGROUND: DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC KEY 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Digital signatures are a particular application of public key cryptogra-
phy. No attempt will be made here to explain the rather complex 
underlying technology in any detail; readers who are unfamiliar with 
basic cryptographic terminology and techniques should consult some of 
the many excellent sources available which can provide the relevant 
technical background.1 The importance of understanding the technology 
cannot be overstated: at least some of the flaws in cryptography-related 
legislation can be attributed to inadequate technical knowledge on the 
part of policymakers. At the risk of oversimplifying to the point of 
inaccuracy, creating a digital signature involves encrypting a numerical 
representation of an electronic message with a private encryption key, 
which the owner keeps secret; verifying a digital signature involves 
decrypting the encrypted data using a related public encryption key, 
which can be made widely available. 
Lawyers have largely focused on what digital signatures can accom-
plish, if implemented in a particular ideal setting. If Alice signs an 
electronic document with a digital signature and sends it over the 
Internet to Bob, ideally Bob can be assured that, first, the message really 
came from Alice. Digital signatures can provide assurance that a 
message has in fact come from its purported sender, a quality called 
"data origin authentication." Second, Bob could know that the message 
he received is the exact message that Alice sent. A digital signature 
enables a recipient of a message to verify that a message has not been 
intentionally or accidentally altered during transmission, a quality known 
as "message integrity." Third, Alice cannot later deny that she sent the 
message. No one else could have sent the message but Alice, and Bob 
can prove that unequivocally. This quality provided by digital signatures 
is known as ''non-repudiation."2 
Two difficult problems must be overcome in order to actually fulfill 
the promise of digital signatures. The first is identification. Alice may 
l. Good sources include BRUCE SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY: How TO KEEP 
YOUR ELECTRONIC MEsSAGES PRIVATE (1995), which is highly recommended as an 
excellent general introduction to the fundamentals of cryptography. Another excellent 
introduction to cryptography and digital signatures is RSA Laboratories, A11swers to 
Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography (visited Jan. 17, 1998) 
<ftp:/lftp.rsa.com/pub/labsfaq/>. A more sophisticated and comprehensive introduction 
to cryptography can be found in BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: 
PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE INC (2d ed. 1996). 
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Ganley, Digital Signatures and Their Uses, 13 
COMPUTERS AND SECURITY 385 (1994). 
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not have sent the message to Bob at all. Instead, a forger may have 
generated a cryptographic key pair, and entered the public key in a 
public key database under the name "Alice." "Alice" and Bob may have 
entered into some business arrangement whereby Bob performed some 
service for "Alice," and "Alice" promised to pay Bob. When Bob 
attempts to enforce bis electronic contract however, he will find that he 
bas been the victim of fraud. Digital certificates, issued by ''trusted third 
parties" called certification authorities, are one attempt to solve this 
problem of identification. 
Certificates are digitally-signed electronic documents issued by CAs 
that attest to the connection of a public encryption key to an individual 
(or other entity). The process might work like this. Alice would 
generate her public and private key pair. She would then present her 
public key to a CA, along with some form of identification. The CA 
would check the identification and take any other steps necessary to 
assure itself that Alice was indeed who she claimed to be. The CA 
would then give Alice a certificate attesting to the connection between 
Alice and her public key. 
The CA must also somehow provide assurance that it is bound to its 
public key, which is used to verify Alice's certificate. Thus, the CA 
could have its own certificate, signed with the digital signature of a 
"higher level" certification authority. This higher level certification 
authority might be (as under some of the enacted digital signature laws) 
a government agency. 
When Bob received a message from Alice signed with Alice's digital 
signature, be could obtain Alice's certificate either directly from Alice 
or from an online database. If the signature on the message could be 
verified using the public key listed in the certificate, and the CA's 
signature verified as well, ideally Bob would know that a CA had 
authenticated Alice's identity, and that he was not dealing with someone 
else posing as Alice. 
The second vexing problem presented by public key cryptography is 
the security of private keys. If a forger somehow discovers Alice's 
private key, that forger can digitally sign Alice's name on documents. 
If a criminal discovered a certification authority's private key, that 
criminal would have the means to commit widespread fraud. As a 
practical matter, in any large-scale system utilizing public key cryptogra-
phy some private keys will become compromised, and the certificate 
containing the corresponding public key will need to be revoked. 
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Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are designed to prevent people from 
relying on a compromised or otherwise revoked public key/private key 
pair. 
A CRL is a list of public keys that have been revoked prior to their 
expiration date. Jfthe private key is compromised, or the key pair is no 
longer in use for some other reason, the public key would be placed on 
a CRL. Thus, before Bob relied on the message that he received from 
Alice, he would check to make sure that Alice's certificate was not on 
aCRL. 
III. DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION 
A segment of the legal community, noting the authentication problems 
associated with the Internet, became increasingly enamored with the 
possibilities of digital signatures. Beginning in 1992, efforts began in 
earnest to develop legal rules to support the type of public key 
infrastructure described above. Many of these efforts took place within 
the framework of the Information Security Committee of the American 
Bar Association's Section of Science and Technology (the "Information 
Security Committee").3 
A primary assumption of this group oflawyers was that the specter of 
large, uncertain liability exposure would prevent the emergence of 
commercial CAs.4 The liability problem has several aspects. First, if 
3. General infonnation about the Infonnation Security Committee can be found 
on the Internet at (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.abanetorg/scitecb/home.hbnl>. 
See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION 
AUTIIORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1 (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL 
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES]. 
4. The effect of this Guideline [3.14] is to preclude liability for breach ofa 
duty not included in these Guidelines. The role of a certification authority is 
developing, and few will enter this uncharted area of business without first 
having the basic rules established with sufficient clarity to enable an evaluation 
of the legal risks of the new business •••. [I]his Guideline seeks to limit the 
legal risk to those described in these Guidelines. 
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 77. The Utah Department of 
Commerce reported the drafting committee of the Utah Digital Signature Law 
commenting to the now-enacted amended version of the Utah Digital Signature Act: 
[The Act] clarifies the liability and risk ofliability that certification authorities 
bear .•.• [A] certification authority must be able to assess and manage its risk 
of exposure to possible liability, and one of the principal impediments to the 
emergence of certification authorities has been the uncertamty of the legal 
risks such a business would undertake. 
DMSION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW: TECHNICALLY AND LEGALLY SECURE 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 58 (1995) [hereinafter UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW], See 
also A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic 
Commerce. 15 OR. L. REv. 49, 109-10 (1996). 
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a criminal defrauded a CA and induced the CA to issue a false 
certificate, the criminal could impose losses on a large number of third 
parties who would rely on the erroneous certificate. The CA could take 
every reasonable step-or even extremely costly, exceptional steps--to 
confirm identity, but still issue an erroneous certificate. If every party 
who relied on the certificate had a claim against the CA for any 
consequent losses, the CA's potential liability could be staggering. CAs 
would be forced to go to extraordinary lengths to confirm identity in 
every situation in order to avoid potential liability exposure, even when 
parties to a given transaction may have been satisfied with a less 
rigorously-procured (and, thus, less expensive) certificate. 
Additionally, CAs face potential liability for claims by parties who 
rely on a certificate after the private key associated with the public key 
listed in the certificate is stolen by a criminal who then creates forged 
digitally-signed documents. This type of harm would be difficult for 
CAs to prevent: they have little or no control over the care a "subscrib-
er"5 takes in protecting their private key :from misappropriation. If CAs 
bear this risk, it will be reflected in the price of certificates, which might 
then be uneconomically high. 
Lastly, CAs face catastrophic liability exposure if their private key is 
compromised. If a criminal obtained a CNs private key, they could 
commit widespread fraud. Additionally, once the compromise was 
discovered, all certificates issued by that CA would have to be revoked 
and new certificates issued, imposing costs on all the subscribers of that 
CA. If CAs face liability for these potentially immense losses, 
entrepreneurs might choose not to enter the CA business at all. 
The liability problem was perceived to be particularly intractable 
because of a "contractual privity problem." CAs could presumably enter 
into contracts with their subscribers, and allocate risk between the CA 
and subscriber via contract mechanisms (i.e., the CA could offer certain 
limited warranties to the subscriber, and limit potential liability to an 
agreed-upon amount). However, the lawyers looking at this issue 
believed that CAs typically would not be able to establish a contractual 
relationship with the parties who would rely on certificates, in order to 
5. "Subscriber" is the term frequently applied to the individual or entity which 
obtains a certificate from a CA. See, e.g., DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 
3, at 50-51. 
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allocate risk by contract.6 Therefore, these lawyers concluded that 
legislation was needed which set out the duties of all parties in this 
public key infrastructure and which allocated liability appropriately. 
The Information Security Committee planned to release a "U.S. Model 
Digital Signature Act'' in June of 1995.7 Increasingly, however, some 
members of the committee grew dissatisfied with the planned legislative 
approach. Ultimately, for a variety ofreasons, the plan to release model 
legislation was dropped. In October, 1995, the Information Security 
Committee did release an Exposure Draft of its Digital Signature 
Guidelines, which it described as "general, abstract statements of 
principle, intended to serve as long-term, unifying foundations for digital 
signature law across varying legal settings."8 The Guidelines, released 
in their final version in August 1996, set out duties for CAs, subscribers, 
and relying parties, consistent with the vision for a PK.I described above. 
The Digital Signature Guidelines avoid talcing positions on certain 
detailed issues that legislation in this area would address, however.9 
In collaboration with the Information Security Committee,1° the state 
of Utah began developing digital signature legislation, and the Utah 
Digital Signature Act was enacted (with considerable fanfare) in March 
6. See id. at 19 (noting that "[t]he relationship between a certification authority 
and subscriber may be primarily contractual ••• " but that "[t]he duties of a certification 
authority to a third party relying on a certificate are rooted mainly in legal proscriptions 
against fraud and negligent misrepresentation."). 
7. The saga of the "U.S. Model Digital Signature Act'' and related developments, 
summarized in the next four paragraphs of the text, is detailed in, Comment, Misplaced 
Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key 
lnfrastn1cture. 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143, 1164-67 (1996), and in the sources cited 
therein. 
8. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES 20 (Exposure Draft 1995). The Guidelines 
clearly contemplate serving as a framework for legislation: the final version of the 
Guidelines make several references to "implementing legislation." DIGITAL SIGNATURE 
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 80, 91. 
9. See, e.g., DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 80 (noting that 
the Guidelines are "intentionally silent" on the duty of care required of holders of private 
keys). 
10, The original, 1995 Utah Act and the [now-enacted] Draft Amended Utah 
Act were developed in collaboration with the Information Security Committee 
of the Section of Science and Technology of the American Bar Association 
(the 'ABA Committee'). The Utah Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation 
Committee and the ABA Committee shared some common redactive personnel, 
and the ABA Committee has for the most part taken an active and supportive 
interest in the Utah Act 
UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 4, at 18. The Information Security 
Committee endorsed the Utah Act "in principle." Letter from Michael S. Baum, Chair, 
Information Security Committee, Resolution by the Information Security Committee on 
the Proposed Utah Digital Signature Legislation, Section of Science and Technology, 
A.B.A. (1994) (on file with author). 
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of 1995.11 Under the Utah Act, a government agency assumes the 
obligations of being a "top level" CA and is charged with policymaking, 
facilitating implementation of digital signature technology, and providing 
regulatory oversight of private sector CAs through a comprehensive 
licensing scheme. Licensing under the Utah Act is voluntary; however, 
licensed CAs are offered certain legal benefits (primarily limited 
liability). The Utah Act imposes detailed duties on CAs, subscribers, 
and relying parties which are consistent with the Digital Signature 
Guidelines, allocates liability among these parties, and accords special 
legal status to digitally-signed documents created using the services of 
a licensed CA.12 
A number of states turned to the Utah Act as model digital signature 
legislation, a process encouraged by the drafters of the Utah law. In 
several public communications, a prominent Information Security 
Committee member who was also involved in the drafting of the Utah 
Act indicated that the Utah Digital Signature Act was substantively 
identical to the unreleased ABA Model Digital Signature Act. In the 
wake of the enactment of the Utah Act, digital signature legislation 
based on the Utah law was proposed in nearly a dozen states. By mid-
1997 Washington and Minnesota had enacted laws which closely tracked 
Utah's, and similar bills remain pending in many states.13 The Utah 
Act proved influential even when not explicitly followed: California 
considered and then rejected the Utah model, enacting a non-technology-
specific bill designed to address transactions with government entities.14 
Early drafts of the regulations, designed to implement the California law, 
closely followed the Utah model, however. 
The "Utah/ABA Guidelines" model has also proven influential at the 
international level. Malaysia recently enacted legislation based upon the 
11. The Utah Digital Signature Act was enacted by 1995 Utah S.B. 82, creating 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1993 & Supp. 1997). It was significantly 
amended by 1996 Utah S.B. 188, which repealed and reenacted large portions of the Act 
The Act is found in its amended fonn at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1993 
& Supp. 1997). 
12. The various provisions of the Utah Act are described in detail in Comment, 
supra note 7, at 1153-63. 
13. The Chicago law finn McBride Baker and Coles provides an excellent 
summary of enacted and pending digital signature legislation at (visited Jan. 17, 1998) 
<http://www.mbc.com/ds_sum.html>. Readers interested in detennining the latest 
legislative developments should refer to that site. 
14. CAL. GoV"T CODE§ 16.5 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). 
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Utah Act;15 similar legislation is under consideration in Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Singapore, and the European Union.16 The United 
Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is also 
studying Utah-style model legislation.17 
Recent legislation proposed at the federal level in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom adopts the Utah/ ABA Guidelines model with 
an added twist: key escrow.18 Under these proposed laws, CAs (or 
TI'Ps-trusted third parties-as they are called under the U.K. bill) not 
only serve to bind subscribers to their public encryption keys used for 
authentication purposes, but also serve as key escrow agents, verifying 
the escrowing of keys used for confidentiality purposes. 
Not all legislative bodies have jumped on the Utah/ABA Guidelines 
bandwagon. Several U.S. states enacted legislation which addressed 
"electronic signatures" and other non-public key methods of authenticat-
ing electronic transmissions. The most thoughtful legislative effort to 
date has occurred in Massachusetts, where concerns over the market-
distorting effects of Utah-style legislation led to a proposed bill which 
is aimed simply at removing existing legal barriers to electronic 
commerce.19 Similarly, the influential National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is considering a uniform law 
on electronic contracting and has not been receptive to arguments in 
favor of a Utah-style law. 
IY. OPEN PKI: THE LIABILITY "TRILEMMA" 
The Utah Act and its progeny, and the ABA Guidelines, are premised 
on an "open system" or "open loop" model of a PKI. The open PKI 
model envisions that subscribers will obtain a single certificate from an 
independent third-party CA which certifies that subscriber's identity. 
15. Bill For Use Of Digital Signatures Approved, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), 
May 6, 1997, at 8. 
16. The McBride Baker and Coles Web site, supra note 13, provides a good 
summary of international developments as well. 
17. UN Trade Law Commission Concludes Session, Adopting Model Law On 
Cross-Border Insolvency, M2 PRESS\VIRE, June 4, 1997 (''the Commission also 
continued its work on legal aspects of electronic commerce, including the questions of 
digital signatures and certification authorities"). 
18. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text 
19. The Information Technology Division of the state of Massachusetts has 
compiled an excellent set of links to PKI related documents, including their own 
proposed legislation, at (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.magnetstate.ma.us/itd/legal>. 
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Certificate holders will then use that certificate to facilitate transactions 
with potentially numerous merchants and/or other individuals.20 
As discussed above, the open PKI scenario implicates considerable 
liability risk. Proponents of the open model, enamored with what digital 
signatures can potentially accomplish, have attributed this risk to flaws 
in the existing legal regime that must be addressed legislatively. This 
conclusion is wrong. The liability exposure faced by CAs under the 
open PKI model is the product of a business model that cannot 
internalize the costs of the inevitable fraud that will result under any 
public key-based system. The resulting liability problem is unlikely to 
be solved at all in the open PKI model, and certainly cannot be solved 
with any one-size-fits-all legislative solution. 
Here is one aspect of the problem: if criminals can obtain something 
valuable by expropriating an individual's private key, they will. There 
is simply no practical way to keep private encryption keys truly secure. 
Proponents of digital signature technology frequently mention the 
concept of storing private keys on tamper-proof smart cards. While 
smart cards, particularly smart cards that incorporated biometric 
measures designed to prevent unauthorized use of a misappropriated 
card, would undoubtedly promote the security of private keys, at this 
point this is simply wishful thinking-this type of smart card is not 
commercially deployed in any meaningful way, and is unlikely to be in 
the foreseeable future. There is currently no realistic way to truly secure 
private keys, and this problem is going to get worse before it gets 
better.21 
20. The "open PKI" vs. "closed PKI" nomenclature is problematic is some 
respects, and is not endorsed here with great enthusiasm. An alternative formulation 
might posit "Generic Identity Certification Authorities" (open PKI) against "Context-
Specific Certifiers" or "Context-Specific Certificate Issuers" (closed PKI). Additionally, 
the terminology "open PKI" and "closed PKI" is not meant to imply open networks or 
open standards vs. closed networks or proprietary technology, but rather to describe 
specific business models. Open systems, in the more typical sense of the tenn, are 
associated with larger markets, lower barriers to entry, more rapid technological progress, 
and ultimately all the benefits of a more competitive market structure. This article 
argues that it is the closed PKI model which can better provide such benefits. 
21. Consider the seemingly endless stream of announcements concerning security 
breaches in the leading commercial Web browsers, some of which would allow a 
malicious hacker to access files-including potentially a private enciyption ke~tored 
on the computer of an unsuspecting user. Many of these problems are cataloged at 
(visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/coast.html>. 
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Private keys will be expropriated, and third parties will rely on 
ostensibly valid but fraudulent documents and suffer losses. The 
aggregate losses could be quite sizable,judging from analogous contexts: 
Mastercard and Visa lose over $1 billion per year to fraud; phone 
companies claim to lose $3 billion a year to fraud; in the city of Los 
Angeles alone fraudulent real estate document filing is said to have cost 
$131 million in a twenty-seven month period.22 Who will bear these 
losses? There are three primary choices: 1) the relying party; 2) the 
individual whose key was used to sign the document; or 3) the CA who 
performed the initial binding. 
Under the Utah Act, the individual whose key was used to sign the 
document bears unlimited liability if they failed to exercise "reasonable 
care" to protect their private key.23 The Act also imposes difficult 
evidentiary burdens on the individual. So, if a subscriber-named 
"Grandmom," just to put things in perspective-does not exercise 
reasonable care, and her key is stolen resulting in losses totaling $25,000 
prior to revocation of her key, that subscriber bears the loss-i.e., 
Grandmom loses her house. Or, if Grandmom does exercise reasonable 
care and her key is still misappropriated, she must present a court with 
"clear and convincing" evidence (the standard under the Utah Act) to 
overcome the presumption that a document signed with her digital 
signature was in fact signed by her. In either case, the result does not 
comport with well-established consumer protection laws (compare with 
the legislatively-imposed $50 consumer liability limit for credit card 
losses, or the fact that one cannot be bound by a fraudulent handwritten 
signature).24 Moreover, no rational consumer would agree to accept 
this level of risk in a marketplace transaction. The benefits of having a 
certificate simply do not outweigh the very real possibility of facing 
extraordinarily large unreimbursed losses. 
22. In 1994 Mastercard reported a loss of $486 million due to credit card fraud; 
Visa's fraud loss was $645 million. Robert Jennings, Fraud is Stealing Holiday Joy 
from Credit Card Companies, AMERICAN BANKER, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1. Phone companies 
estimate that they lose about $3 billion to calling card fraud and other types of fraud. 
Peter Sinton, V"rsa Has Sights Set on Credit Card Fraud, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
Sept. 14, 1994, at B-1. L.A. County District Attorney Gil Garcetti estimated that county 
residents were cheated out of $131 million between July 1990 and November 1992. 
Timothy J. Moroney, Review of Selected 1995 California Legislation, 27 PAC. L.J. 451, 
452 (1996). 
23. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-305(1) (Supp. 1997). The Utah Act does not define 
''reasonable care," and no guidelines or consensus exists over what steps are appropriate 
for protecting private keys. 
24. These arguments are set out in detail in Comment, supra note 7, at 1167-86. 
See also U.C.C. § 3-403(a) ("an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as to the 
signature of the unauthorized signer''). 
1236 
[VOL. 34: 1225, 1997] Digital Signature Laws 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Yet if the subscriber does not bear full liability under this scenario, 
where else would the loss fall? On the CA? They could neither prevent 
the harm, nor realistically insure against such indeterminate losses via 
pricing mechanisms. CAs presumably would not know whether a 
particular certificate was going to be used in a purchase of a piece of 
clip art or in a real estate closing. Thus, the CA could not charge a 
price that would be commensurate with the CAs corresponding risk of 
loss if the CA were to bear liability for fraud involving the certificate. 
Could the loss fall on the relying party? The goals of a PKI would be 
undermined, and an opportunity for fraudulent collusion would be 
presented, if the relying party bears the risk.25 
While the issues are perhaps less stark, this "liability trilemma" plays 
out similarly for each liability scenario present under open PKI. If CA 
liability is limited for erroneous certificates issued through no "fault'' of 
the CA, who bears the risk of loss when fraud does occur? The relying 
party? The individual whose name is on the certificate, despite the fact 
that they may have no connection to the situation at all? What if CA 
liability is limited in the event of a compromised CA private key? Will 
the loss fall on any relying parties who are consequently defrauded? On 
subscribers who must revoke and replace certificates? 
The fundamental assertion of this article is that there is no satisfactory 
solution to this problem under an open PKI model. Certainly there is no 
one-size-fits-all solution that can be imposed via legislation. As further 
described below, it is conceivable that market mechanisms may be able 
to solve this "liability trilemma" via contracts, and the "contractual 
privity problem" is no barrier to this result. However, this result is 
nonetheless unlikely: the open PKI model is an inherently flawed 
business model. 
25. If relying parties bore the risk of loss, fraudulent collusion could occur when 
a subscriber willfully discloses their private key to a criminal knowing that, existing laws 
concerning fraud aside, the subscriber will not bear any resulting loss. Moreover, apart 
from intentional wrongdoing, subscribers would presumably have less incentive to be 
cautious with their private keys, more keys would be stolen, and, thus, the reliability of 
digitally signed documents would be increasingly suspect and the envisioned PK.I would 
be underutilized. 
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V. THE "CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY" RED HERRING 
The "contractual privity problem" as a justification for open PKI-
oriented legislation is a red herring. At least one commercial CA, 
VeriSign, has emerged unsupported by legislation, and is largely 
pursuing the open PKI model. This CA is betting a substantial 
investment that they can form "webwrap" or "click-through" contracts 
with relying parties when the relying parties verify certificates. That is, 
when relying parties connect to the VeriSign Web site to determine 
whether a particular certificate has been revoked (placed on VeriSign's 
CRL), they are presented with a "click through'' agreement which 
defines the limited warranties VeriSign offers to relying parties on 
certificates and which strictly limits VeriSign's potential liability. 
VeriSign enters into a similar agreement with subscribers when the 
subscriber first obtains a certificate.26 
Click-through agreements are not without their problems. The 
question of whether they are enforceable at all is not definitively settled, 
and there can be other potential problems depending on specific 
circumstances.27 However, this issue is not unique to the CA industry. 
26. One aspect ofVeriSign's approach is puzzling. VeriSign attempts to bind both 
subscribers and relying parties to legal tenns detailed in its Certification Practices 
Statement (CPS). The Digital Signature Guidelines similarly envision a CA's CPS as 
setting out the basic legal relationship between CA, subscriber, and relying parties. 
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 32-33. This approach is problematic. 
Certification Practice Statements are fundamentally misconceived as legal docwnents; 
they are full of technical infoanation that simply is not legally relevant Jwnbling up 
CA-subscriber legal terms, CA-relying party legal tenns, and complex technical 
infoanation in a single docwnent creates contract foanation problems that are virtually 
insurmountable. 
A more effective approach would be to use two short contracts: a CA-subscriber 
agreement, and a CA-relying party agreement There would be only a few key 
provisions in each contract warranties (both CA to subscriber/relying party as well as 
covenants from subscriber or relying party to CA), warranty disclaimers, liability 
limitations, indemnification, dispute resolution, and choice of law. These provisions 
would not have to be drafted in a particularly complex fashion. For example, there is 
no need for a CA to warrant that they will take steps A through Z, in numbing detail. 
Rather, a CA can simply warrant that a particular set of facts will be true, and then scale 
their liability for nonperfonnance of those promises through liability limitation 
provisions. A CA could incorporate a CPS by reference into their contracts, if they 
wanted to link their promises to a particular set of practices, but this really is not 
necessary. A CPS would better serve as a marketing docwnent rather than a legal 
document 
27. See Carey R. Ramos and Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinkwrap and Click-On Licenses 
After ProCD v. Zeidenberg, nm COMPUTER LAWYER, Sept 1996, at 1. See also Gary 
H. Moore and J. David Hadden, On-Line Software Distribution: New Life For 
'Shrinkwrap' Licenses?, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Apr. 1996, at 1 (noting, among other 
things that ''the 'on-line' version of the ubiquitous 'shrinkwrap' license stands a far 
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Many online businesses are forced to rely on click-through agreements. 
Several recent court decisions have strongly suggested that they will be 
enforceable; a legislation-drafting effort underway is attempting to settle 
the question.28 Click-through agreements present a mechanism by 
which CAs can attempt to allocate risk contractually.29 
Accordingly, the open PKI model can compete in the marketplace in 
the absence of any special legislation. Independent commercial CAs can 
form enforceable contracts with both subscribers and relying parties, via 
click-through agreements, and, thus, allocate risk contractually. Various 
CAs utilizing this model presumably would compete on warranty, 
indemnification, liability limitation, and other contractual terms. This is 
not a winning business model, however. 
Even utilizing the :flexibility and dynamism of the market, CAs 
practicing the open PKI model will not be able to solve the "liability 
trilemma." In the long run, CAs will not be able to simultaneously offer 
certificates at reasonable prices, along with contract terms acceptable to 
both subscribers and relying parties. The open PKI model simply poses 
greater chance of being enforced than its hard-copy cousin."). 
28. Two recent federal appellate court decisions have upheld the enforceability of 
"shrinkwrap" agreements using a rationale which will also support the enforceability of 
"click-through" agreements. See ProCD, Inc. v. Ziedenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-3294, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 176 (7th Cir. 
Jan. 6, 1997). The National Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws and 
the American Law Institute are nearing completion of an amendment to the Unifonn 
Commercial Code which will endorse click-through agreements. See (visited Jan. 17, 
1998) <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/>; Carole A. Kunze, A Guide to the Proposed Law 
on Software Transactions: Draft U.C.C. Article 2B- Licenses (visited Jan. 17, 1998) 
<http://www.softwareindustiy.org/issues/guide/index.html>. 
29. A similar mechanism for allocating risk via contract mechanisms is discussed 
in David G. Masse and Andrew D. Fernandes, Economic Modelling and Risk 
Management in Public Key Infrastructures ,i 178 (Version 3.0, Apr. 15, 1997) (visited 
Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.chait-amyot.ca/docs/pki.html>. This thoughtful paper, 
presented at the RSA Data Security, Inc. annual symposium in San Francisco on January 
31, 1997, touches on many of the same issues presented in this article, although it 
reaches some different conclusions. One potential hitch with the scenario described here 
is if a court honors a relying party's claim against a CA, in a circumstance where the 
relying party failed to check a CRL, or where a relying party relied on an expired 
certificate which the CA no longer maintained on a CRL, and, thus, did not enter into 
a contract with the CA. This result seems unlikely, however, in light of the ''unreason-
ableness" of not checking a CRL or relying on an expired certificate; a court would 
likely determine that such actions constituted an assumption of risk ofloss by the relying 
party, at least as between the relying party and the CA. If this result were to 
consistently occur it could be dealt with in focused legislation. 
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too much inherent risk of loss that must be borne by one of these three 
parties. 
VI. THE CLOSED PK.I MODEL 
To assert that open PK.I is not viable is not to say that public key 
cryptography will not play an important role in electronic commerce. 
The closed PK.I model offers some significant benefits, and will likely 
compete and win in the marketplace for use in a variety of applications. 
A closed PK.I has been defined as a system wherein a contract or a 
series of contracts identifies and defines the rights and responsibilities of 
all parties to a particular transaction.Jo This definition came about in 
response to the assumption that the "contractual privity problem" 
prevented contract formation with relying parties in an open system. As 
discussed above, this is an erroneous assumption: CAs can form 
contracts with relying parties in an open system. Thus, a better 
definition of a closed system is one where public key mechanisms are 
used within a specific, bounded context.JI 
Risk management is the critical area of difference between closed and 
open PK.I. Within a bounded context the liability allocation problems 
which are intractable under the open model become manageable, 
primarily because potential liability exposure is quantifiable and limited 
in scope. For example, the proprietor of an online "mall" might issue 
certificates to potential customers and to merchants. The proprietor, 
acting as a CA, has the opportunity to enter into contractual relationships 
both with consumers and with the merchants who will rely on the 
certificates, and, thus, can allocate risk contractually. Moreover, the risk 
to be allocated is relatively small. Unlike under the open model, the CA 
knows exactly what the certificates that are issued will be used for. The 
CA can accurately predict and manage potential losses, and either absorb 
this cost via pricing mechanisms, or assign it to either subscribers or 
merchants by contract. 
Similarly, a merchant might issue certificates directly to its customers. 
The owner of an online magazine, for example, might mail diskettes 
containing certificates directly to subscribers of the paper version of the 
same magazine. Such certificates could be installed on the subscriber's 
Web browser and used to access the online magazine, and perhaps to 
30. This definition was used in the Repon of the ILPF Working Group on 
Certification Authority Practices, at app. 2 (draft Feb. 24, 1997) (visited Jan. S, 1998) 
<http://www.ilpf.org/work/ca/draft.htm>. For more infonnation about the Internet Law 
and Policy Forum, see (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.ilpf.org>. 
31. Note that some problems and alternative fonnulations exist with the 
open/closed PKI nomenclature. See supra note 20. 
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order related merchandise. The magazine vendor would be well 
positioned to determine whether such certificates would be sufficiently 
trustworthy for the purposes for which they were being used. Again, 
such a scenario does not implicate the difficult risk allocation questions 
associated with the open model. 
Another example might be a business-to-business trading network. 
Businesses may have processes and equipment in place which enables 
them to carefully manage private encryption keys. They may thus be 
quite willing to agree to contract terms much more "onerous" than the 
terms imposed by the Utah Act, for example. A business might agree 
to be strictly liable for all documents signed with its private key, under 
the appropriate circumstances. A closed PKI system preserves this type 
of flexibility. 
In addition to better risk management capabilities, the closed PKI 
model offers another benefit: the ability of a certifying entity to 
realistically certify attributes or authority as opposed to identity. As 
other commentators have described, the seemingly mundane concept of 
identity "is a very subtle notion whose nuances go to the very core of 
human social and economic interaction."32 CAs practicing the open 
model are unable to capture these nuances, and instead bind public keys 
to identification information that is frequently irrelevant in an online 
transaction. Who a person is--in the sense of knowing, say, their name 
and address-may be less relevant than knowing whether they have 
authority to act on a corporation's behalf, or whether they are entitled to 
access a particular online resource, or whether an account they have is 
valid. The closed PKI model can manage both the logistics and risk 
associated with attribute or authority certificates; the open PKI model 
cannot.33 
Stephen Kent gave a fascinating talk last year entitled "Let a Thousand 
(Ten-Thousand?) CAs Bloom,"34 and his central theme deserves 
32. Masse and Fernandes, supra note 29, at 'If 106. See also Carl Ellison, 
Establishing Identity Without Certification Authorities (July 22-25, 1996) (visited Jan. 
17, 1998) <http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/usenix.html>. 
33. Masse and Fernandes, supra note 29, at 'If 123; see also id. at 'If 126 et seq. 
( discussion of "credential certificates"). 
34. Stephen Kent is a well-known and highly respected cryptographer affiliated 
with BBN Corporation. The presentation was given at the DIMACS Workshop on Trust 
Management in Networks on September 30, 1996. See (visited Jan. 17, 1998) 
<http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Management/program.html> for a description of 
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repeating: let anyone who wants to be a CA be a CA, certifying their 
own customers, employees, members, etc. Individuals do not need one 
overarching identity certificate, to be used in every conceivable 
circumstance. People can have many certificates, inconspicuously 
installed in a Web browser, each of which is used in a specific, narrow 
context. Within the confines of such a bounded context the risk 
allocation questions which are insurmountable under an open PK! model 
become much, much easier. Moreover, unlike the rigid, hierarchical 
structure of an open PK!, such a scenario embraces the chaotic, fast-
paced environment of the Internet. 
Market trends appear to support the conclusion that the closed model 
will be the winner in the marketplace. Recall the flurry of announce-
ments concerning commercial CA services which took place in early 
1996. VeriSign was spun off from RSA. GTE CyberTrust announced 
its imminent competing "CyberSign" service. Nortel began issuing 
demonstration sever certificates, and was rumored to be on the verge of 
launching full-blown CA activities. MCI, AT&T, and IBM all hinted at 
planned CA services.35 The U.S. Postal Service announced its inten-
tions to act as a CA.36 
Look at the state of the commercial CA marketplace now. CyberTrust 
finally started issuing certificates in early 1997-but only for SET,37 
which presumably will leverage the risk allocation mechanisms already 
present in the bank card industry. The CyberSign service, based on the 
open PK! model, has evidently been abandoned in favor of CyberTrust's 
emphasis on their "customer branded service."38 CertCo, a Bankers 
the conference. Kent's presentation is summarized at (visited Jan. 17, 1998) 
<http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/ManagementlKent.hlinl>. 
35. For example, in early 1996 Netscape Navigator version 2.x came equipped to 
recognize certificates issued by MCI, AT&T, and others. Froomkin, supra note 4, at 
112. 
36. Shawn P. McCarthy, Postal Service Can Time-Stamp Certified Mail As E-Mail, 
Safely, GoVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, November 18, 1996, at 39. 
37. SET is the Secure Electronic Transactions protocol promoted by Visa and 
Mastercard, among others. For links to basic information about SET, as well as a 
thoughtful and provocative criticism of the SET effort, see Simson Garfinkel, Is the Web 
Set for SET?, HoTWIRED: PACKET (June 18, 1997) <http://www.hotwired.com/packet/ 
garfinkel/>. 
38. In response to an early draft on this article, Tom Carty, Vice President of 
Business Development & Marketing for GTE CyberTrust, e-mailed the author and wrote: 
GTE strongly endorses the closed PKI model. This has been reflected in 
CyberTrust's architecture from the beginning in the form of Customer Branded 
Service which is based on or Virtual Certification Authority (YCA) technolo-
gy. This closed form of PKI service has been adopted by a number of our 
customers and is well suited to many of the business needs today. We believe 
business customers have established relationships with many of their customers 
and are in the best position to determine who should receive a certificate for 
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Trust spin-off and a newer entrant into the CA industry, appears to be 
focused largelf on a contract-oriented model.39 The rumors of Nortel's 
(now Entrust4") inlpending entry into the CA business proved false. 
Entrust's services focus exclusively on back-end support for other 
companies that want to offer CA services. Likewise, IBM's offerings 
focus on back end support.41 The Postal Service's plans never materi-
alized. All of these developments are consistent with the dominance of 
the closed PKI model. Industry players are focusing their attention on 
"letting ten-thousand CAs bloom." 
VeriSign is the only North American company that is actively 
pursuing the classic open PKI model as a business model. Indeed, 
judging from their press releases they are doing so with some success, 
and they are planning innovative ways of addressing problematic aspects 
of their business model, such as via a recently-announced limited 
insurance plan for subscribers. However, even VeriSign used the high-
profile forum provided by the 1997 RSA Data Security Conference to 
announce its ''Private Label Digital ID Services," which are back-end 
support for companies that want to offer CA services.42 Thus, even 
VeriSign is focusing on offering its services to other companies on an 
outsourcing basis, consistent with the closed PKI model. 
VII. OPEN PKI LEGISLATION LIVES ON 
Despite increased recognition of the problems associated with the open 
PKI model, legislation enshrining this model in law and regulation 
continues to be proposed and enacted. This can partly be attributed to 
factors that could be labeled "psychological." The rigid, straightforward 
hierarchies inherent in the open model are likely deeply appealing to the 
operating with them as business clients. 
E-mail message from Tom Carty, Vice President, GTE CyberTrust, to C. Bradford 
Biddle, (May 26, 1997) (on file with author). Other senior executives from companies 
active in the certification authority industty also responded with similar comments. 
39. See Chris Jones, Banking Spin-Off to Issue Digital Ids: CertCo 's Software Will 
Distribute Electronic Transaction Risk, INFOWORLD, Jan. 13, 1997, at 21. 
40. See (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.entrustcom> for more information. 
41. See (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.intemet.ibm.com/commercepoint/ 
registty/index.html>. 
42. VeriSign Provides Custom Digital ID Services to Large Corporate Customers: 
NOVUS Services and Toppan Printing of Japan Among Those to Select VeriSign to 
Provide Digital Authentication Services for Internet Customers, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 27, 
1997) <http://www.verisign.com/pr/pr_large.html>. 
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sensibilities of lawyers and legislators as they contemplate the often 
chaotic and inscrutable Internet. Moreover, enacting legislation-even 
legislation that is not well-understood----satisfies the legislative urge to 
"do something" in the face of a rapidly changing economic environment. 
Additionally, legislators may be under the mistaken impression that 
special legal rules are needed to accommodate electronic commerce. In 
fact, however, the law is quite flexible and supportive of new commer-
cial methods.43 The oft-heard assertion that enforceable electronic 
contracts cannot be formed in the absence of a legislatively-endorsed 
digital signature is simply wrong.44 As a general matter, legislation is 
not needed in order to accommodate public key cryptography or other 
emerging authentication technologies. The few areas where existing 
legal rules impede electronic commerce can be addressed with narrow, 
targeted legislation. 45 
Another factor behind the continued momentum of open PKI digital 
signature legislation is less benign: the infrastructure created by such 
legislation is ideally suited for implementation of a key escrow scheme. 
Indeed, such an idea was initially broached by the Clinton Administra-
tion in a report released in May of 1996. This report described a vision 
for a PK.I consistent with the Utah/ABA Guidelines model, and noted: 
To participate in the network a user needs a public key certificate signed by a 
CA which ''binds" the user's identity to their public key. One condition of 
obtaining a certificate is that sufficient information (e.g., P,rivate keys or other 
information as appropriate) has been escrowed with a certified escrow authority 
to allow access to a user's data or communications. (As noted before, this might 
be the CA or an independent escrow authority) •••• 46 
43. See Benjamin Wright, Electronic Commerce Legislation: Frequently Asked 
Questions, CYBERSPACE LAWYER., Apr. 1997, at 10. See also Peter N. Weiss, Security 
Requirements and Evidentia,y Issues in the Interchange of Electronic Documents: Steps 
Towards Developing a Security Policy, reprinted in XII JOHN MARSHALL JOURNAL OF 
COMPUTER AND INFORMATION LAW 425 (1993). 
44. This point is made quite effectively, and examples of the misinformed 
conventional wisdom are given, in BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE, EDI, E-MAIL, AND INTERNET: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF, AND LIABILITY§§ ET 
1.1, 1.4, 1.5 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1996). 
45. The draft legislation in Massachusetts provides an example of le.(:islation 
narrowly tailored to provide clarity concerning issues such as signature, writing, and 
records requirements. See Massachusetts Electronic Records and Signature Act (draft 
Nov. 4, 1997), (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.magnetstate.ma.us/itd/legaV 
mersa.htm>. 
46. Executive Office of the President, Office ofManagement and Budget, Enabling 
Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure 
(May 20, 1996), (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/white_ 
paper.html>. 
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Draft legislation designed to implement such a plan was released in 
April, and a bill was introduced in the Senate in June.47 Similar 
legislation was introduced in the United Kingdom.48 The profound 
civil liberties concerns implicated by such legislation, and the negative 
effects on commerce of the policies underlying key escrow, are well 
documented.49 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The open PKI model envisioned by many existing and proposed 
digital signature laws is not viable. This legislation presumes a business 
model that cannot internalize the costs associated with its implementa-
tion. In attempting to solve an unsolvable problem, current digital 
signature laws shift an immense liability burden onto consumers who use 
the infrastructure envisioned by these laws. Consumers would reject this 
result in any true marketplace transaction. 
Digital signatures will play a significant role in electronic commerce, 
but under a closed PKI system where the liability problems associated 
with digital signatures become manageable. The open PKI model can 
and should compete against closed PKI and other authentication 
technologies without the benefit of special legislation. It will not, 
however, be the winning business model. 
Digital signature laws which impose a particular view of electronic 
commerce on the marketplace should be abandoned. The time for 
legislation and regulation is after identifiable problems exist in a mature 
industry, not before an industry even exists. The existing legal infrastruc-
ture can accommodate new technologies without dramatic new legisla-
tion. Premature legislation and regulation risks creating market 
distortions which can prevent the market from arriving at much better 
results than those envisioned by governmental policymakers. Certainly 
this is true in the case of open PKI: digital signature legislation based 
47. S. 909, the McCain-Kerrey "Secure Public Networks Act," was approved by 
the Senate Commerce Committee on June 20, 1997. Secure Public Networks Act, S.909, 
105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). See also (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.cdtorg/ 
crypto/> ( containing details concerning the draft legislation released in April and for 
updated information concerning S. 909). 
48. See (visited Mar. 26, 1997) <http://dtiinfo.dti.gov.uk/pubs/>. 
49. See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over 
Cryptographic Key "Escrow," 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 15, and sources cited therein. 
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on the Utah/ABA Guidelines model imposes a business model which 
could not survive under the discipline of the marketplace. 
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